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ABSTRACT
Toward Population Control:
Philosophical and Constitutional Aspects
of National Population Policy
by
Kenneth J. Isaacson
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 16, 1975 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Science.
There are both environmental and social reasons for re-
quiring a drastic reduction of population growth - the ultimate
goal being zero population growth. The idea of limiting
a person's right to bear children, while at first seeming
offensive, is not much different from the other kinds of
social controls which government enforces. An examination
of the concepts of descriptive liberty and emotive liberty
show us that society can indeed exert many controls on
our rights, even within a framework of freedom. As the needs
of society change, more controls become necessary to insure
maximum individual liberty.
Congress can find the authority to act in the field of pop-
ulation policy in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution,
which describes the spending powers of the Legislature.
However, given our present concepts of personal privacy and
environmental quality, the courts may not recognize the necessary
"compelling state interest" which is needed in order to interfere
with a right as basic as that of procreation. Congress,
through the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and
the courts through a train of decisions leading up to Sierra
Club v. Morton, have shown a realization of a possible con-
stitutional right to a decent environment, but the Supreme
Court's decision in Sierra made it.clear that this right
would not be recognized just yet.
To ask whether compulsory population control measures would
presently be accepted by the Supreme Court is, however,
to some degree, of little use. Insofar as the Court's
decision usually reflect popular attitudes, given today's
sentiment such measures would fail. But this type of appraisal
has little significance, for the enactment of mandatory
population legislation, in itself, would signify a broad
change in public opinion, and thus open up any previous
constitutional analysis to question. It is in the context
4of the future setting that the constitutionality of such
programs must be-hypothesized.
A different way of thinking about our environment is necessary
if we are to realize the government's overriding interest.
Professor Stone's idea of assigning legal rights to natural
objects would facilitate such a way of- thought. Only when
we come to realize the importance of privacy and individual
liberty and environmental quality, and the relationship
which excessive population growth has to these, will we be
able to control our growth and free ourselves.
Thesis Advisor: Leonard Buckle
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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7CHAPTER ONE. WHY WORRY ABOUT POPULATION GROWTH?
The probability of the need for the development of
a stable.society which does not continue to make drastic
demands on the world's resources is near certain in the
foreseeable future. This development has been called a
no-growth society, a stable society, a stagnant society,
or a world ecological system which is in equilibrium.
Whatever it is called, most serious students of Spaceship
Earth are convinced of the necessity for controls on re-
source utilization, on economic and industrial growth, and
on size and make-up of the world's population.
Of all future policies which must be conceived of and
evolved, that which concerns population growth is probably
the most complex. While studies of population and methods
of family planning have made a significant contribution to
understanding the dynamics of population change, control,
and growth, there has been very little attention paid
to the theoretical justification for and legal methods by
which absolute limits on population. can be instituted as
matters of public policy within any given society. Given
the theoretical background for a democratic society (the U.S.)
and given the legal framework within which such a society
functions, the idea of a mandate limiting population is
bound to be controversial, for it attempts to exert control
over an area which is most revered by Americanst the
right to bear children.
8This sacred right of procreation derives from a
concept of personal liberties which has its origins in a
time of growth and expansion. As population increases,
and reserves of food and nonrenewable resources decrease,
however, it grows necessary, as a matter of survival, to
re-examine our ideas of privacy, and our obligations to
our fellow man.. Our responsibilities to others, we may
find, might overshadow our right to reproduce.
This is, indeed, the case. While solely curbing the
spiraling growth of population will not alleviate all of
the pressures being exerted on our. eco-system, such an action
is a necessary first step. As with all of our other rights,
that which allows us to bear children is not absolute, for
one may exercise his free will only while his actions
do not infringe upon the rights of others. And just as
a company cannot deprive the public of a clean beach by
depositing waste in a river, and a neighbor cannot deprive
an individual of peace and quiet by making a nuisance of
himself, nor can we, as members of a society which is over-
crowded and without adequate resources, deprive our fellow
citizens of the necessities of life by thoughtlessly con-
tributing to the problem of overpopulation.
A national population policy which would limit growth
is both necessary and proper.
The United States government officially recognized
the possibility of the existance of a population problem
with the formation of The Commision on. Population Growth
9and the American Future on March 16, 1970. In proposing
this Commission in July, 1969, Richard Nixon said:
"One of the most serious challenges to human destiny in
the last-third of this century will be the. growth of the
population. Whether man's response to that challenge
will be a cause for pride or for despair in the year 2000
will depend very much on what we do today."
The Commission, in March, 1972, recommended, among
other things that '"recognizing that our population cannot
grow indefinitely, and appreciating the advantages of
moving now toward the stabilization of population, the
nation (should) welcome and plan for a stabilized population."1
Today, three years later, we are no closer to having a
well-defined population policy.
On the eve of the nation's bicenntenial commemoration
it is necessary not only to celebrate our past, but also
to question o-ur future. We are faced with problems of
poverty, of careless exploitation of resources, of environ-
mental deterioration, and of decaying cities and wasted
countrysides. The longer we wait to address these issues,
the more difficult it is to implement their solutions.
The time to act is now.
How Do We Grow?
Malthus begins his Essay on Population (1798) by
postulating that "The passion between the sexes ... will
10
remain nearly in its present state,"2 and finds, as a
consequence, that population tends to increase geometrically.
He has stated, very simply, the underlying element in the
process of population growth: the sex urge. This desire,
it is generally agreed, is very strong in most of us for
most of our lives. This strength, argues Desmond Morris
in Thg Naked Ape (1961), is no biological accident, nor
is it "... some kind of sophisticated, decadent out-growth
of modern civilization, but a deep-rooted, biologically
based, and evolutionary (sic) sound tendency of our species. 3
The need for what he calls "pair bonding", which ensures
a stable relationship between parents during the years
that an infant is typically-helpless, has caused man's
sexuality to evolve and progress to the intensity that it has,
therefore,-is not only the means of creating living beings,
but is also the "incentive" for the long and difficult
task of protecting them and teaching them until they are
old enough to fend for themselves. It should be noted
here that no distinction is made between the reproductive
urge and the sex urge. According to Morris' thesis, the
desire to create babies and the desire for the activity
which would normally create them is one and the same.
It is sufficient to say that the sex urge is quite powerful,
and that its natural outcome is reproduction.
We are all very familiar with the results of the
phenomenon of reproduction. The size of the world population
is evident to us; what is not apparent is the rate which
it grows. Figure 1 shows the history of the world population
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FIGURE 1.
World. Population:
Time taken by the earth to
evolve each billion human beings.
Human Time taken
billions K Year A.D. (years)
1t 1830 4.5billion
2nd. 1930 100
3rd 1960 30
4th 1975 15
5th 1987 12
6th 1995 8
7th 2000 5
8th
9th
10th .
11th_
12th
Source: Porulation vs. Liberty, Jack Parsons
Note: Time taken-for 1st billion is put at 4.5 billion'
years, which is accepted as the approximate age of the
earth. We can substitute the nunber 50,000 years which
is the approximate age of our species hono sariens without
changing the dramatic impact of the figures.
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in terms of billions of people and the number of years
it took to produce each. It is evident that if present
trends were to continue, it would not be long before we
were faced with the awesome task of preparing for the arrival
of an additional billion people in the space of one year
The kind of growth which Figure 1 depicts is ex-
ponential growth. Figure 2 shows the exponential growth
curve of world population. In 1650 the population was
0.5 billion and was growing at a rate of 0.3% -per year.
In 1970 there were 3.6 billion people, and the rate of
growth had increased to 2.1%. From this we see that
not only is the population growing exponentially, but the
rate of growth has been growing also.
The size of the population, at any given time, is
determined by the birth rate and the death rate. In a popula-
tion with constant fertility (the fertility rate is defined
as the number of births per 1000 people), the larger a
population, the more babies are born. This, obviously,
makes a larger population. After a delay to allow these
babies to reach child-bearing age, even more babies will
be born, swelling the population even more. If there were
no deaths in such a population, it would increase exponen-
tially. The number of deaths each year is equal to the total
population times the average mortality. If, for instance,
a population has a constant mortality rate (i.e. x percent
die each year), then each year fewer people will die, because
there are fewer people in the population. Assuming no births,
13
FIGURE 2
World Population
Billions 6
of
people
U N . U. "
i ojection
0 2'00
Source: Limits to Growth, Meadows, et. al.
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the population would decline to zero. The behavior of real
populations is quite complex, though, because they experience
varying fertility and mortality rates as well as both births
and deaths.
It now becomes easy to understand the recent "super"-
exponential rise in world population. Before the industrial
revolution, both fertility and mortality were high.
The birth rate generally exceeded the death rate, but only
slightly. This produced an exponential increase in population,
but at a slow rate. But with the advent of modern medicine,
better public health techniques, and great agricultural
advances, the death rate dropped considerably. So, while
fertility has decreased slightly, mortality has diminished
even more, resulting in a sky-rocketing population increase.(Fig.2)
The New York Times reported, in April, 1974, that birth
and fertility rates in the United States had dropped to
their lowest points in history in 1973. This decline was
interesting because people were expecting quite the opposite -
something that might be called an "echo-boom." As potential
parents who were born during the post-war baby boom came
o: age, it was anticipated that birthrates would rise accord-
ingly, producing a kind of "echo" of the original increase.
Instead, however, general fertility is down, offsetting the
increase in the number of people entering child-bearing years.
The Population Commission proposes two factors which
would explain this decline in fertility. First, many
young people today are postponing their time of childbearing;
15
they will have children at a later age. This effect, of
cQourse, is temporary because when the desired age of child-
bearing is reached, babies will be produced.4
The second factor is that today's younger generation
expect to have fewer children in their completed families.
A 1971 Census Bureau Survey shows that married women, aged
18 to 24 expect to have, on the average, only 2.4 children.
Experience with surveys of this type, however, show that
young women tend to underestimate the number of children
they will have.5
Since the proposed factors explaining the fertility
decline are not conclusive evidence that such trends will
continue, there is no reason to believe that the United States'
period of population growth is coming to an end. In fact,
Kingsley Davis, in Population Policy: Will Current Programs
Succeed? says: "There is no reason to expect that the millions
of decisions about family size made by couples in their
own interest will automatically control population for the
benefit of society. On the contrary, there are good
reasons to think they will not do so. Population growth
in the United States has developed a great momentum. Even
if immigration ceased, and couples had, on the average, only
two children (necessary just to replace themselves), the
population would continue to grow for at least another
seventy years* With immigration remaining at its present
level, a "two-child family" (remember, this is an average)
would produce an additional 65 million people by the end of
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this century, for a total of 271 million Americans. In
order to achieve an immediate halt in population growth,
the birthrate would have to drop by about 50%. This would
mean that young couples would have to average only one child
per family - something that is very unlikely.
We have seen that the "tendency", which Malthus mentions,
of population to grow is quite a natural force - a foundation
of the evolutionary process. Benjamin Franklin, in Essay
on the Increase of Mankind (1751) argued:
There is, in short, no bound to the prolific nature of
plants or animals, but what is made by their crowding
and interfering with each other's means of subsistence.
Was the face of the earth vacant of other plants, it
might be gradually sowed and overspread with one kind
only, as, for instance, with fennel; and were it
empty of other inhabitants, it might in a few ages
be replenished with one nation only, as, for instance
with Englishmen.7
Malthus, however, does recognize certain checks to
mankinds's increase, for "reason" will cause- man to ask
himself whether he will be able to provide the means of
subsistence for those he brings into the world. But, if
society's system of social control were to collapse, allowing
free rein to the "natural tendency" of growth, we can see
from our preceding discussion about the exponential nature
of population increase that the consequences would be horrifying.
As Desmond Morris puts it:
Thanks to medical science, ... we have reached
an incredible peak of breeding success. We have
practised death control and now we must balance
it with birth control. It looks very much as though...
we are going to have to change our sexual ways at
least ... Not because they have failed, but because
they have succeeded too well. 8
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What Will Stop Us?
Many people take the attitude "Why must we worry about
population growth? Sure, we have more and more people every
year, but science and technology are advancing. They have
always provided the solutions to our problems before; there is
no reason to believe they will fail us now. Science will
find a way to sustain our growing population." There is,
however, a problem with that view. We live in a world
which is finite. For instance, there is a limit to how much
space there is, there is a limit to how much pollution can
be absorbed by the atmosphere before it will affect us, and
there is a limit to our reserves of non-renewable natural
resources.
No one, in the times of Franklin or Malthus, thought
it possible for man to actually "use up" the earth, but
we of the twentieth century must face the fact that at least
some of the ltmits to growth on earth are being approeched.
A research -team at M.I.T. headed by Dennis Meadows, in
conjunction with The Club of Rome, conducted a study of
the nature of these bounds. Their controversial findings
are reported in The Limits to Growth?
Thg Limits to Growth examines the physical necessities
"that support all physiological and industrial activity -
food, raw materials, fossil and nuclear fuels, and the
ecological systems of the planet which absorb wastes and
recycle important basic chemical substances."1 0 Through
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use of a much criticized "world-model", they posit that if
present growth and usage trends are continued, one or more
of these "necessities" will vanish well before the year
2100. We do not really need a computer model to tell us,
however, that food shortages and lack of certain resources
already exist. While Meadow's model is not perfect, it can
be helpful in understanding the interrelationships of factors
which cause .such shortages. The great body of litigation
which exists concerning environmental issues suggest that
there is genuine reason for concern about the survival of
our eco-system. (see discussion in Chapter 3)
Whether we are approaching the physical limits to
growth or not, it is relatively easy to see the nearing
social limits. Many of our urban problems (e.g. crime,
poverty, traffic) can be traced to population size and density.
Figure 3 shows the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
statistics on the relationship between urban crime rates
and size increase. In addition to crime we are forced to
submit to invasions of our privacy, many of us having to
live in overcrowded conditions not conducive to good physical
or mental health. We can very rarely drive from one point to
another without experiencing some kind of traffic tie-ups,
and it is becoming increasingly difficult to even walk through
the city without being jostled by the crowd. Says Jack
Parsons in Population vs. 1.6iberty: "The existance we must
begin to picture in our mind's eye (if population growth
continues) is life in a society which is, psychologically
19
FIGURE 3
Increase in crime rates
with increase in size:
Urban crime rates per
100,000 population 1957
S 7ze of cities
criminal murder,non-negligent
homicide minslaughter
criminal manslaughter by
homicide negligence
rape
aggravated assault
robbery
burglary, breaking or entering~
larceny-theft
auto-theft
lover 250,000
5.5
4.4
23.7
130.8
108.0
574.9
1 ,256.0
337.0
50,000 to
100,000
4.2
3.7
'9.3
78.5
36.9
474.6
1,442.4
226.9
under
10,000
2.7
1.3
7.0
34.0
16.4
313.3
992.1
112.9
Adapted from F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, Annual Bulletin
(1957) (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office 1958)
p.92
I
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speaking, one long strap-hang in a rush hour tube train."
We find ourselves bounded, then, by two sets of limits:
physical and social. There are a number of ways in which
these limits can be reached. Figure 4 illustrates the
"ultimate carrying capacity" (be it determined by physical
or social limits, or a combination) can be approached by a
growing population. The population can (a) adjust its growth to
equilibrium just below the capacity, (b) overshoot the
capacity and die back in a smooth or (c) occillatory way.
Or (d) it can overshoot the limit and in doing so decrease
the carrying capacity (by consuming certain non-renewable
resources). - Any option in which the decrease in population
growth is precipitated by having crossed the carrying capacity
of the system ( b,c, or d) is clearly hazardous. Such
decrease in growth would necessarily be brutal, being brought
about by famine, drought and other shortages. Obviously,
option (a), that of adjusting our growth below the limit
is the most desirable.
We may already be too late. The limits to growth
may have been passed already, and we are just now beginning
td experience the consequences (Figure 4 b, c, d). Even
if we haven't reached those limits yet, it may be too late
to avoid them. We have seen that U.S. families reproducing
merely at the replacement level (average of two children)
would give us still another 65 million Americans before
growth stopped!
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No one knows which mode of behavior our world population
is following. The question is: Can we afford to wait and
see? The world will not benefit from more people straining
its limits. Nor will the United States profit from additional
growth. The Population Commission found that:
no substantial benefits would result from continued
growth of the nation's population ... We further
concluded that the stabilization of our population
would contribute significantly to the nation's ability
to solve its problems ... Stabilization would "buy time"
by slowing the pace at which growth-related problems
accumulate and enhancing opportunities for the
orderly and democratic working out of solutions.12
Americans, then, have nothing to lose and everything
to gain by adopting a program directed towards halting
population growth.
owCan WeSto?
Basically, there are two ways in which to stop the
increase in a population. Since population size is determined
by the difference between the birth rate and the death rate,
a stable population can be reached by controlling either
the birth rate or the death rate.13 Medicine and technology
have succeeded in lowering the death rate considerably
since the Industrial Revolution - and there is no reason
to believe that anyone would want (or allow) this to
change. The solution, then, is necessarily to reduce
the birth rate. Since we have seen that there is no reason
to believe that this will happen on its own (indeed the
opposite seems likely), and since immediate action is essantial
23
the government must take the initiative.
Any government action in realm of population control
is bound to cause dispute because of the necessary inter-
ference with the right of privacy in sexual relations. All
governmental attempts so far to legislate in any related
matters - abortions, contraceptives, sterilization - have
been met with public controversy. Most people appear to
regard the right of procreation as absolute. The government,
they seem to feel, has no right to delve into the private
world of sexual relationships of married couples. That would
be totally unacceptable, given the framework of our society,
for it is our right to reproduce as we wish.
In -. society such as ours, we must concern ourselves
with two aspects of the problem of mandatory population
control. "Is it legal? (i.e. does our legal system provide
a mechanism by which it can be instituted?) Is it justi-
fiable? (i.e. is the idea obnoxious to our concept of
liberty?) We return, then, to the question alluded to in the
opening paragraphs: Are there legal ways by which a mandate
. limiting population can be reconciled within a framework
of freedom?
24
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CHAPTER TWO. FREEDOM. LIBERTY AND RIGHTS
Compulsory population control involves interference
with a personal right: the right to reproduce. When
we say we have a right to do something, we mean we are
free to do this thing at our will; we are at liberty,
because no one has the authority to force us to refrain
from this action.1  Most people can agree on the desira-
bility of freedom, but there is usually a great amount
of misunderstanding about just what it means to "be free."
A popular concept of liberty, which Parsons calls the
"commonsense approach,' states that if society (usually
in the form of the policeman) is not actually stopping
one's car in the street, taking one away in handcuffs,
or carrying out some other official activity that is an
obvious limitation on one's liberty then that society is
"free."
The commonsense approach to liberty is, of course,
not realistic. Our freedom of behavior is drastically
reduced by a myriad of rules and regulations. When we
add to these constraints on individual liberty those informal
restrictions which are more or less binding through public
opinion, we find that in a modern society, very little liberty
actually exists.
Another notion of liberty is one that sees the absence
of all controls on behavior whatever. Th Shorter Oxford
Dictionary defines "liberty," in part, as "Faculty or power
26
to do as one likes ... Free opportunity or scope to do
something *.. Unrestrained action, conduct or expression,
3license, etc! Such a total lack of restrictions would be
a state of anarchy. Aristotle saw that such a state would
actually reduce individual liberty: "Justice is believed
to consist ... (of) liberty in doing exactly what one likes.
In extreme democracies, therefore, everyone lives as he
pleases ... But this is an altogether unsatisfactory conception
of liberty. It is quite wrong to imagine that life sub-
ject to constitutional control is mere slavery; it is in
fact salvation.
Hence, we see that while arbitrary restrictions on
behavior reduce our freedom, some form of "social control"
is needed to insure individual liberty. Emile Durkheim,
in Th Division of Labour in Society argued:,"... If all
authority ... is wanting, the law of the strongest prevails
and latent or active, the state of war is necessarily chronic.
That such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is quite
evident, since it runs counter to the aim of society, which
is to suppress ... war among men, subordinating the law of
the strongest to a higher law. To justify this chaotic
state w vainl praise its encouragement of Individual
liberty. Quite on the contrary, bety ... j itself
the f .1 can be fr only = th ex~t~flt3;_g product __ regulation*. anbe.realy3;.tgxet
that other a forbidden to Drofit from their ... superiority
to th detriment of _y liberty. But only social rules
5
Can prevent abuses of oower .
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Maurice Cranston has made an observation which may
help us explain much of the .confusion about the concept of
liberty. Says he: "o. while -the descriptive meaning of
'liberty' ... varies, the emotive meaning tends ... to-be
constant." 6 We find that as the needs of society change,
we are forced to accept a constantly varying "descriptive"
definition of liberty (in the form of new "social rules"),
while we maintain that "emotional" feeling for freedom which
we hold. The addition of new social controls, in order to be
accepted, must not require behavior which differs too much
from that already allowed within the present descriptive
content of "freedom." If it does not - that is, if the content
of "liberty" does not change too drastically, then these
new controls become incorporated into the new definition
of freedom. These two ideas (descriptive and emotive)
are quite distinct. if you were to ask someone who says
"We live in a free society" what that means, the reply
would more than likely be "It means I can do anything
I want to." But examine all the constraints on behavior
necessary for that society to function, and you will see this
is not so.
We-see, therefore, that in -order for a control to be
acknowledged as legitimate, this question must be answered:
Does this ask of me anything radically different from
what has heretofore been required of me? (i.e. does it
change the descriptive definition of freedom much?) If
not, then I can adopt it as part of my behavior and still
28
subscribe to that emotive definition of liberty which I
hold so dear (and still say "I am free to do as I- wish").
To determine the propriety of population control,
then, we must concern ourselves not with this emotive concept
of liberty - which is, in society actually nothing more than
an illusion - but with the descriptive connotation of the
word "freedom."
Liberty In Sgciety
Henry David Thoreau, in his essay Civil Disobedience,
tells us: "That government is best which governs least."7
He extended this reasoning and concluded that that government
which governs not at all would be ideal* While we have seen
that this is not the case, that some government is necessary,
we can still accept Thoreau's first premise: "least is best."
It is this question of "How much is too much?" which has
thwarted philosophers and political scientists in their
attempts to describe a truly free society.
American thought on this subject finds some of its
origins with John Locke. His Second Treatise on Civil
Government contains many of the i'deas concerning liberty
which are later found in the Declaration of Independence.
The Treatise begins with a description of a "State of
perfect Freedom", which all men are naturally in,_ and in
which all are free "within the bounds of the Law _ofNalature"
to do as they wish.9This Law of Nature, says he, is Reason,
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which teaches that , everyone being equal, "... no one ought
to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions." 0
The enforcement of the Law.of Nature will prove to be difficult
because "... it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their
own cases ... " So, to provide the control necessary to
enforce the Law of Nature, "... Civil Government is the
proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State of Nature ... "1
For summary Locke Says:
The Natural Liberty of Man is to be free from any
Superior Power on Earth, and not to be under the Will
of Man, but to have only the Law of Nature for his
Rule. The Liberty of Man in Society, is to be under
no other Legislative Power, but that established,
by consent ... nor under the ... Restraint of any Law,
but what the Legislative shall enact, according to the
Trust put in it. Freedom then.is not what Sir R.F.
(Robert Filmer) tells us ... A Liberty for everyone to
do what he lists *.. and not to be tye! by n Laws:
But Freedom of Men under Government, is, to have a
standing Rule to live by, common to every one of that
Society and made by the Legislative Power erected in
it; A Liberty to follow my own Will in all things,
where the Rule prescribes not; and not to be subject
to the ... Arbitrary Will of another Man ...
... where there is no Law, there is no Freedom.13
The United States has never been, nor has the claim
in a state of "Natural Liberty" (i.e. under no restraint
but the Law of Nature). The Continental Congress, in the
Declaration of Independence recognized, "... that to secure
these rights (Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness,
and other unalienable rights), Governments are instituted
among men ..." to make social rules. In fact, one of the
stated reasons which impelled them to dissolve the ties with
England was that they were being denied certain laws which
were necessary to ensure individual liberty: The King
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"... has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and
15
necessary for the public good." Eleven years later,
in 1787, Congress established a Constitution "... in order to...
establish justice *.. and secure the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity .. "16 A government had been
formed and given the power to make rules, in the form of
laws, which would not enslave its citizens, but make them
free.
The power of the government to control, however, is
not absolute. Questioned Cicero: "And I ask you, if the
people had commanded that I should be your slave, or you
mine, would that be validly enacted, fixed, established?"
There is, then, some boundary beyond which even the will of
the people cannot transgress; there is a sphere of activity
which remains immune from public control.
There is much to be debated about the limits to the
authority of society over the individual; it involves complex
moral issues concerning not only society's responsibilities
to the individual, but also a citizen's responsibilities to
the commonwealth. However, if we look closely at the stated
reasons for the institution of gov.ernments, we will see
that the -limits to authority are implied therein.
Consistently, we have seen government viewed as a
shield - that which protects the individual from actions of
others, where these actions might make it difficult for
him to exercise his rights. From this viewpoint, it would
seem logical that any actions which do not impair the
011
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ability of others to carry out their will should be beyond
the control of society. Everyone is free to do as he wills,
provided .l does not infringe the freedom of anyone else.
"Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage ... either
to an individual or to the public, the case is-taken out
of the province of liberty, and placed in that of ... law."18
Anything which affects only the individual actor, or others
.y choice, is not within the realm of societal control.
The Changing Needs Of Societyt 'Descriptive' Liberty Varies
We spoke earlier of the varying descriptive content
of liberty. This was brought about, we said, by the changing
needs of society. Let us examine what is meant by this.
The simplest illustration of how the necessity for new
controls can be brought about by change is one where tech-
nological advances make possible activities which did not
exist before. Prior to the invention of the automobile,
it would have been absurd and impossible to think of
automobile traffic laws. With the advent of the motorcar,
it became apparent that in order to protect pedestrians and
horse ridersand to allow drivers the full enjoyment of their
cars, certain regulations concerning the use of this new
instrument were necessary. For example, in New York, when
driving through town it was required to have a person running
well ahead of the auto, to warn people of its approach!
This law did not change the descriptive content of-people's
liberty too much. In the past, before the car, most people
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were naturally courteous and careful when using other modes
of transportation. This new necessity (that of a runner), brought
about by a technological advance (i.e. cars), was a "logical"
extension of previous behavior requirements, and therefore
acceptable. Obviously, behavior had become restricted
one could not drive through town without a runner - but
people were still able to comfortably say "I am free to
travel (drive) as I wish." We know, of course, that the
sentence should end with ". provided I obey the law."
Radio and television provide us with another example.
Before radio or TV was invented, no one even knew that
broadcast frequencies existed. Now, there is a huge federal
agency which deals with the regulation of their use.
The change in the content of liberty can be brought
about by socialas well as technological, advances. With
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, people were no
longer allowed to own slaves. This was the product of a
slow social process in which people's values and morals
were re-examined and changed. The issue, of course, was
controversial, but on the whole it reflected the realization
that slaves were human beings and not property. Hence, there
were more restrictions on behavior (people could not own
slaves), but one was still "free" to dispose of his property
as he saw fit.
Now, in addition to technological and social consider-
-ations, ecological needs are also bringing about changes in
our content of liberty. Congress recently enacted a bill
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regulating strip-mining practices, thereby recognizing that
a continuation of present mining activities would mean
certain ecological disaster. When reserves of coal were
considered "unlimited", and mining could not possibly damage
the eco-system, companies were free to mine as they wished.
Now, on the brink of disaster, practices must change.
oppulation And The Changing Needs Of Society
All of the above examples concern activities whose
public nature is relatively easy to understand. It is not
hard to see that automobiles can be dangerous, and therefore
must be controlledi it is also obvious that the keeping of
slaves - the denial of basic rights to a whole class of
people - is of great public import. (It should be realized
that a little over a century ago this was not obvious.)
But population control involves meddling in a very private
sphere of activity. Have the needs of society changed so, so
that a matter as personal as sexual relationships is of
public concern? Dr. *Heenan, Archbishop of Westminster asked:
"If a man and woman decide to have ten children what business
can it possibly be of yours or anyone else's?" Concerning
this query demographer Lincoln Day says that while "repro-
duction is a private act ... it is not a private affair,
it has far-reaching social consequences."2 0
Mill, in his Essay on Liberty spoke of this distinction
between actions which in themselves are private (involving
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the invidual only), and their social consequences:
If, for example, a man, through intemperance or
extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or,
having undertaken the moral responsibility of a
family, becomes from the same cause incapable of
supporting or educating them, he is deservedly
reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for
the breach of duty to'hisfamily or creditors, not
for thg extravagance. If the resources which ought
to have been devoted to them had been diverted from
them for the most prudent investment the moral
culpability would have been the same. George Barnwell
murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress, but
if he had done it to set himself up in business, he
would equally have been hanged ... In like manner,
when a person disables himself, by conduct purely
self-regarding, from the performance of some definite
duty incumbent on him to the public he is guilty of
a social offense. No person ought to be punished
simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman
should be punished for being drunk on duty.21
According to Mill, then, actions which are strictly
private, =g Ig, can be "... taken out of the province of
liberty, and placed in that of ... law"22 not because of the
act itself, but because of its consequencest and it would
not matter if the original act, in and of itself were
laudable.
In Chapter one we discussed reasons why the explosion
in population growth is cause for concern. We have seen the
social consequences 2 of an uncontrolled increase in pop-
ulation size. At the root of these problems are sexual
relationships (which cause population growth), which are
private, Par se, and definitely not inherently reprehensible.
It is the consequences, which are now critical because of
the changing nature of society, and not the private act of
procreation itself. That placed the matter "in the province
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of law" and should allow us to add new social controls
of our liberty. Even al long ago as 1858, Mill saw justi-
fication for population control:
The fact ... of causing the existence of a human-being,
is one of the most responsible actions in the range of
human life. To undertake this responsibility - to
bestow a life which may be either a curse or a
blessing - unless the being on whom it is bestowed
will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable
existence, is a crime against that being. And in
a country either over-peopled or threatened with being
so to produce children, beyond a very small number,
with the effect of reducing the reward of labor by
their competition, is a serious offense against all
who live by the renumeration of their labor. The
laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid
marriage unless the parties can show that they have
the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the.
legitimate powers of the state: and whether such-laws
be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent on
local circumstances ... ) they are not objectionable
as-violations of liberty. Yet the current ideas of
liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements
of the freedom of the individual, ... would repel the
attempt to put our restraint upon his inclinations when
the consequence of the indulgence is a life or lives
of wretchedness... to the offspring, with manifold
evils to those 'sufficiently within reach to be in
any way affected by their actions. 24-
Couples reproducing indiscriminately in countries
which are over-crowded will ultimately interfere with the
rights of both those produced and those already existing
in society; the act of reproduction can therefore be con-
trolled.
The Legal Concept of Nuisance
There exists, in law, a concept which helps protect
the rights of property owners from infringement by others:
the law of nuisance. While it is not suggested that new-born
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babies can actually be-- classified as "nuisances", a discussion
of this legal concept may be helpful in illustrating the
ways in which it might be said that uncontrolled population
growth interferes with the rights of others.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "nuisance" as:
That which annoys and disturbs one in possession of
his property, rendering its ordinary use or occupation
physically uncomfortable to him
Everything that endangers life or health, gives offense
to senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs
reasonable and comfortable use of property
or which unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use,
in the customary manner, of any navigable lake or
river, ... or any public park ... 25
Nuisances are usually classified as public, private,
or mixed. A public nuisance is one which affects an in-
definite number of people, or the public in general. A
private nuisance affects one or a small group of property
owners in a way different from its impact on the general
public. Since it is often difficult to draw the line be-
tween a-public and a private nuisance - many nuisances
affect the general public as well as the private rights of
a particular property owner - some circumstances fall into
the mixed nuisance category. There is no hard and fast
rule which determines what constitutes a nuisance - that is,
what use injures the property of others, and at what point
does that use become unreasonable. Each case tends to be
unique and it turns out that a "nuisance may be merely a
right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard."26 The law makes a distinction
between acts, occupations, or structures which are nuisances
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at all times (nuisance per se) and those which become nuisances
by reason of circumstances and surroundings (nuisance
per accidens). "... Whether a thing not a nuisance er se
is a nuisance per accidens .. * depends upon its location and
,2 7
surroundings ... or other circumstances .0.. It is not,
necessary that the act creating the nuisance be, in itself,
illegal, for a "... lawful business may be conducted in such
a-way as to amount to a nuisance, either because of its
location or because of the effect of the operation." 2 8
For many years, those who are concerned with the
cleanliness of our environment have sought to use the law
of nuisance to eliminate certain causes of pollution. The
emission of smoke and dust which menaces the health of the
public2 9 or interferes with the quiet enjoyment of one's
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property can be declared a public nuisance. There
must, however, be more than a mere inconvenience; for
smoke to be a nuisance, there must be a perceptible injury.
This does not mean that impairment of health must be shown,
for in some cases serious discomfort and annoyance may
constitute a nuisance.32
The declaration of something as constituting a nuisance
depends upon, as we -noticed above, "unreasonable" use of
one's property. In order to determine "reasonableness"
the courts usually resort to a practice commonly known as
"balancing the equities" (the plaintiff's right to enjoy
his property versus the defendant's same right with respect
to his peoperty).
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..We live in a business culture. It is a culture
that has shaped our values to meet the needs of an
industrial system. The effect of this background
of values is evidenced in the development of nuisance
law. In nuisance law the equities of the situation
were balanced. This meant that the reasonableness of
the defendant's actions was the prime factor to-be
considered in this balancing process. This reasonableness
of use depended upon an idea of progress, and by tending
to resolve the question in terms of industrial development
limited the effectiveness of the nuisance doctrine in
protecting the environment."33 (citations omitted)
Thus, in Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Coooer & Iron
Co. Ltd.,4  although the court recognized that pollution
destroyed the complainants' crops, it refused to grant
injunctive relief because it would "blot out two great mining
....enterprises, destroy half the taxable values of a county,
and drive more than 10,000 people from their homes.,,3 5 The
court did not, however, in balancing the equities "consider
possible harm from the air pollution in question to thousands
and even millions of citizens other than the immediate
complainants... "36
The difficulty in proving the required damages gave
rise to two developments: courts simply began to find damage
to the public by taking "judicial notice" that impure air
was harmful, and legislatures declared dense smoke to be a
nuisance per se. But for the most part one single identi-
fiable source ot pollution can be found, because increased
levels of pollution are caused by thousands of installations
and automobiles. So, the law of nuisance, as it stands, is
relatively ineffective against pollution.
The late Chief Judge Vanderbilt of New Jersey saw
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justification, then, for legislation which would protect the
environment:
the reason for a municipality making unlawful the
emission of smoke is readily apparent. The issuance of
dense smoke from a single chimney, is and of itself,
may be altogether harmless and cause no ... damage
to the public, but if smoke of like density issued
from hundreds of chimneys, the contamination of the
atmosphere would be substantial and the injury to
the public considerable, yet for the lack of the
requisite elements of a public nuisance at common
law, the municipality could obtain no relief by way
of indictment. Ordinances making unlawful the emission
of smoke are therefore obviously necessary and rasonabl
-and a valid exercise of the local police power.
We see, then, that certain concepts contained in the
laws of nuisance can be adapted to use against pollution.
While the common law of nuisance,.itself, has been ineffective
in controlling the problem, the courts and legislatures
have taken cues from the ideas, and are slowly moving re-
cognizing the dangers to our environment.
babies As Nuisances
.If we examine the population problem in the context
of-the discussion about nuisance and related law, we will
see that although it cannot be asserted that those who
reproduce indiscriminately are creating a nuisance, and
therefore can be stopped, the idea of controlling and in
some cases halting, a lawful activity is not foreign to our
concept of liberty. We have seen that those who are respon-
sible for conduct, legal or illegal, which because of cer-
tain circumstances causes damage to another party, can be
required to cease such activity. Procreation is, of course,
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a right. The activity which brings it about is unquestionably
lawful. In "balancing the equities," in the context of today's
situation however, is careless reproduction reasonable? We can
no longer make the mistake that the Ducktown court made
when it refused to see the immense existing and potential
harm if this "nuisance" is allowed to continue.
Whose Responsibility?
It is often hard for people to understand just who
is responsible for the population boom. A family in the
United States producing thirty children in 1970 would have
increased the population of the country by approximately
0.000000015 percent - that is, just slightly more than one
ten-millionth of one percent. It' is no wonder that parents
see their own responsibility in producing an "explosion"
as very small.
Unfortunately, all individual members of all populations
are produced by individual couples. No matter how large
the population, it is all brought about by infinitesimal
increments.
Parsons relates a scenario, simple and somewhat
absurd, which will help understand where the responsibility
lies. Because it describes the problem so well, it is quoted
in full:
If, instead of what is actually happening, all the
three billion or more surplus infants expected by the
year 2000 were being produced by a small and clearly
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identifiable - not to say miraculously fertile -
group the citizens of Fertilia* say, possibly on
another planet, whose friendly and cooperative progeny
overflowed throughout the world so that the result
at the receiving end was exactly the same as if the
surplus had continued being produced locally, some-
what different attitudes could be expected. In
otherwise stationary populations, all the new competi-
tion for space, food, shelter, raw materials, working
capital, education, recreation, transport, and the
rest would be identifiable as members of an outgroup,
Fertilia, and all the pent-up frustration we now feel
at the constantly increasing pressure of numbers
would almost undoubtedly be directed against them.
If the skins of Fertilians happened to be a
different color the outcome could be cataclysmic
but even without this element the situation would
be explosive enough and a powerful reaction would
be generated against the pathologically fertile source
of the pressure. Sanctions sufficient to cure the
problem, whatever they entailed, would almost certainly
be forthcoming - even annihilation of Fertilia - and
the world would heave a sigh of relief when the pressure
was turned off, even if the price were some twinges
of conscience.
At the moment we have no social mechanism, legal
or otherwise, or much of a philosophy, for focusing
our feelings on the source of so many of our problems
and furstrations because population pressure is not
generated by the carefree copulations of the Fertilians
but by our own mums and dads, friends and neighbors,
or - worst of all - by us in person. We cannot direct
our frustrated aggression at these targets so the
fuse must fizz on until something which can explode
is reached, but however reluctant wa may be g recog-
nize responsibility in this sohcre U& law. has Eta.
clar precedents others.38 (," citation omitted.)
In the past we have acted to control the causes of
danger to our society, even when our instinct told us that
those responsible had a "right" to act as they did. We
would change our description of liberty slightly to fit
the demands of the situation, and still satisfy our need
to be free. The control of reckless population growth is
no different.
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CHAPTER THREE. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The preceding chapters have attempted to establish the
existence of a problem of excessive population growth, and
the moral justification for its mandatory control. This
chapter will examine the legal implications of such a policy.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose a specific
population policy, but two assumptions about this policy
will be made: uniformity in approach being essential, the
policy must be federal rather than state-wide, and the
policy will somehow place compulsory control on what is
referred to as the right to procreation.
Any exercise of federal power must be based on a con-
stitutional authorization. This criterion is present for
all constitutional matters, for the national government has
only those powers which are specifically granted to it or
which may be implied from one or more of its delegated
powers. The fact that a problem may be national in
nature does not automatically give the federal government
power to act. 2
If an action of the government is challenged as un-
constitutional, it is the Supreme Court that decides whether
the Constitution can be interpreted in a way which allows
such acts. The fact that a policy might be normally justi-
fied is not enough to make it constitutional. Justifi-
cation must be found in the Constitution, explicitly or
implicitly. We shall examine whether, given the present
46
ideas concerning our environment, and man' s responsibility
to it and to fellow man, the Supreme Court could accept as
constitutional a national policy of mandatory population
control. If such a policy is not permissible, what develop-
ments in our system of law are necessary so that something
which is both moral and essential would be also legal?
Ordinary Powers
Population policy is not mentioned anywhere in the
Constitution. This, however, does not necessarily mean
that the government is forbidden to delve into such matters;
as noted above Congress can assume powers which can be
implied from other specific powers* For example, in
3
Perez v. United States the Consumer Credit Protection Act
was upheld against the claim that the commerce clause
(Congress shall have 'power to ... regulate commerce ... among
the several States.) did not give Congress the power to
control the purely local activity of loan sharking. The
Court there stated that "activities affecting commerce"
are reachable by Congress even "without proof that the
particular intrastate activity against which a sanction was
laid had- an effect on commerce.". The power to so regulate
was implied in the commerce clause.
Therefore, although we cannot find population control
mentioned in the Constitution, we may find justification for
congressional action in the spending powers in Article I,
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section 8. This gives Congress the power to "lay and collect
taxes *.. to pay the debts and provide for the ... general
welfare of the United States." and to "make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers *.." Supreme Court decisions concerning
the spending powers of Congress show that the views of Alexander
Hamilton rather then those of James Madison prevail. 5
Hamilton was in favor of allowing federal funds to be used
very liberally, their use being limited only by the consti-
tutional provision that the "general welfare" must be en-
hanced.6  Using this philosophy, Congress, then, may make
population policy as long as its expenditures are not de-
pendent on depriving persons of their constitutional rights.
This idea of "unconstitutional conditions" means, for instance,
that Congress may not establish a church, or create a famility
which was segregated by race. Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution, therefore, may provide a basis for congressional
population policy.
Emersency Powers
In addition to ordinary powers, Congress might take
on certain special powers during periods of national emergency.
We spoke earlier of man's responsibility to his society.
Professor Carl J. Friedrich commented on this while speaking
of the concept of "constitutional reason of state":
When there is a clash between the commands of an
individual ethic of high normativity and the needs
and requirements of organizations whose security
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and survival is a stake ... the issue of reason
of state becomes real. For reason of state is nothing
but the doctrine that whatever is required to insure
the survival of the state must be done by the indi-
viduals responsible for it, no matter how repugnant
such an act may be to them in their private capacity
as decent and moral men.7
The concept of "reason of state" is not an openly
acknowledged principle of constitutional law.. In fact,
it is used quite rarely - only in times of extreme emergency.
There are two Supreme Court cases which adequately illustrate
the utility of this doctrine, and its possible use in the
field of population policy.
In Korematsu v. United States , the Court upheld the
forcible exclusion of native-born American citizens of
Japanese ancestry from areas of the West Coast during World
War II. Korematsu is representative of a series of cases,
the Japanese Exclusion Cases, which constitute the largest
single mass deprivation of personal liberties in American
history. The opinion states:
We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was
made and when the petitioner violated it ... In doing
-so, we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed
by it upon a large group of American citizens e. But
hardships are a part of war ... All citizens ... feel
the impact of war in greater or lesser degree.
Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its
privileges, and in time of was the burden is-always
heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of
citizens from their homes, except under conditions
of direct emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions. but when under
conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened
by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.9
The Korematsu decision is significant for two reasons.
First the Supreme Court accepted the deprivation of rights
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to a large class of people on grounds of national security,
and second it did so without questioning the judgment
of danger by military and political leaders of the government.
They did not examine the record to determine whether there
had in fact been a danger to the nation. The Court, therefore,
did not bar, in times of widely perceived danger (based
on fact or not), actions thought to be necessary for the
national security.
In another case - Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell10 - the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota-statute
which permitted "mortgage moratoriums" during the economic
emergency of the Great Depression. This statute was in
direct contravention of the "obligation of contracts"
clause in the Constitution (No State shall ... pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts ... ) There,
the Court explaineds
In determing whether the provision for this temporary
and conditional relief exceeds the power of the State
we must consider the relation of emergency to consti-
tutional power ...
Emergency does not create power. Emergency
does not increase granted power or remove or diminish
the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved.
The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave
emergency. It grants of power to the Federal Govern-
ment and its limitations of the power of the States
were determined in the light of emergency and they
are not altered by emergency ... 12
Whatever doubt there may have been that the pro-
tective power of the State, its police power, may be'
exercised - without violating the true intent of the
provision of the Federal Constitution - in directly
preventing the immediate and literal enforcement of
contractual obligations, by a temporary and condi-
tional restraint, where vital public interests would
otherwise suffer, was removed by our decisions relating
to the enforcement of provisions of leases during
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a period of scarcity of housing.13
The opinion goes on to explain that there is "a growing
recognition of public needs and the relation of individual
right to public security, (by which) the court has sought to
prevent the perversion of the (obligation of contracts)
clause through its use as an instrument to throttle the
capacity of the States to protect their fundamental interests."14
Chief Justice Hughes finally concluded that the statute
merely varied the remedy, not the obligation, of contracts.
The Court shows us that the power existed, and the emergency
provided the environment in which it could be exercised.
So far population growth has not been deeme4- aen
immediate threat to the national security. Whether the
idea of "reason of state" could be used in justifying action
depends largely on whether some catastrophe due to growth
existed. It does not seem likely that such a catastrophe
would be acknowledged in the near future, and, as was noted,
emergency powers, being by nature contrary to constitutional
rule, - are used only when in dire need* It would, therefore,
not be a sound basis for population policy of the type
with which we are concerned - but should conditions change,
and disaster of some sort become imminent, there is legal
precedent to justify the institution of controls.
Barriers To Action
Having established a constitutional basis for federal
intervention we can now examine the factors which must
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shape the content of a national population policy. (Note
that we have only demonstrated a justification for action,
not an explicit description of what a policy may prescribe.)
The right to procreate is intertwined with at least
two other important rights - those of marital privacy and
of freedom of religion. Any policy which would deprive
families of the right to decide when and how often to bear
children would interfere with these liberties. The law
provides numerous constitutional barriers to the enactment
of compulsory population control measures.
The Right To Procreate
Mr. Justice Douglas suggested, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,1 5
that the right to procreate is a "natural " one. The
opinion, which deals with a case challenging compulsory
sterilization for habitual criminals, states:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves
one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
.procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if
exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating
effects ... There is. no redemption for the individual
whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State
conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever
deprived of a basic liberty.-16
There does exist, then, a precedent for outlawing compulsory
population control measures. The court has considered the
right to procreate a basic right; but as we saw in chapter
2, constitutional rights may be balanced against societal
interests by the Court.
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The Right To Marital Privacy
The right to marital privacy is distinct from that to
procreate. Indeed, the recognition of a right to marital
privacy could make compulsory controls impossible whether
or not the Court found that a right to procreate existed
population control means legislating in an area which
is open to only husband and wife.
1 17Griswald v. Connecticut establishes this conjugal
privacy. In this case the Court invalidated a Connecticut
statute which forbade the use of contraceptives, recognizing
that the right of a woman to decide whether or not to have
a- child is based on a right to privacy in marital relation-
ships. If the state may not invade this privacy to forbid
the use of contraceptives, it would follow that the require-
ment of contraception would infringe this same right. As
with the right to procreate, though, an overriding state
interest may allow interference.
The Freedom Of Religion
The First Amendment, which guarantees the freedom of
religion, may be seen as an obstacle to mandatory regulation.
All forms of artificial contraception are forbidden by some
religions. Compulsory measures would require, for example,
-Roman Catholics to act contrary to their religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the First Amendment, has
drawn a distinction between belief and conduct, however.
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In Cantwell v. Connecticut 18 it was held that "the Amendment
embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things,
the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation
for the protection of society."1 9 As the right to religious
freedom is no different from any other right then: religious
conduct may be regulated in the pressence of a valid com-
pelling state interest.
In summary: the Constitution, it appears, would allow
mandatory population control measures which restricted
fundamental rights, only if an overriding state interest
were demonstrated.
How '"Compelling" An Interest?
We. are now faced with the question of what makes the
interest of the state "compelling" enough to justify inter-
ference with personal rights. The Supreme Court faced this
question in the context of compulsory sterilization in
1927 in Buck v. Bell 2 0 when it upheld Virginia's eugenic
sterilization law.
This statute provided for the sterilization of any
inmate of a state institution whenever such action was
considered to be in the best interests of the patient and
society. Carrie Buck was an eighteen year old girl who was
committed to a Virginia home for the feeble-minded. Both
her mother and her daughter were feeble-minded.
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Before the Supreme Court, it was not argued that the
pl-aintiff had been denied procedural due process; there was
a system of notification and hearing provided for in the law
which was supposed to ensure the inmates' rights. "The
attack is not upon the procedure, but upon the substantive
law. It seems to be contended that in no circumstances could
such an order be justified. It certainly is contended that
the order cannot be justified upon the existing grounds." 2 1
Mr. Justice Holmes then went on to explain that substantive
due process was unharmed:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare
may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It
would be strange if it could not call upon those
who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
for crime, or let them starve for imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind. The principle tnat sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the
Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.22
Buck found that substantive due process was not
violated by compulsory sterilization in order to prevent
the procreation of defective children. The same argument
can be offered to the Court in defense of a program of
compulsory population control against charges that it
violated substantive due process, i.e. the right to procreate.23
One of the objections to the Buck decision is the assumption
that conditions which the law sought to control were in fact
hereditary, even though no scientific basis for such a
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24belief existed. This line of reasoning could not be used
against a population program, for the connection between
such a policy and the reduction of population growth is
obvious.
The case of Skinner v. Oklahoma, mentioned above, in
which the Court overturned a compulsory sterilization law,
does not weaken our argument. Unlike Buck, it was not de-
cided upon grounds of substantive due process, but upon that
of equal protection. The Court disallowed the sterilization
of habitual criminals because of a clause in the Oklahoma
statute which exempted from such punishment "persons con-
victed of offenses rising out of violation of the prohi-
bitory laws. revenue acts, embezzlement or political offenses." 25
Mr. Justice Douglas said that "When the law lays an unequal
hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same
quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other,
it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had
selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment."26
By resting their decision in Skinner on denial of
equal protection, the Court did not come to consider the
consequences the statute held for substantive due process.
The opinion stated that the Court need not delve into the
question of what the effect would be if Oklahoma were to
remove the offending clause from the statute.2 7
The decision in Buck is informative in determining
when the Court considers a government's interest so
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compelling that- it may interfere with fundamental personal
liberties. Justice Holmes showed that because feeble-minded
persons' traits were considered hereditary, they were thought
to be a danger to society. The state had an overriding
interest to limit their rights "in order to prevent our
.28
being swamped with incompetence, through the birth of more
defective children. If the population of the United States
reaches a point where the birth of every child is considered
a threat to the general welfare, the reasoning used in Buck
may justify compulsory controls.
LegSal Recognition Of The Problem
What we have seen in the preceding sections is that
any compulsory population control measures must be based
on the fact that a vital compelling state interest is to be
protected. In chapter 1 we noted how excessive population
growth was affecting both our privacy and our environment.
The law provides us with methods of protecting these things to
some extent. (The law of nuisance mentioned in chapter 2
is one example). The acceptance of a mandatory population
program, then, depends mainly upon the extent to which the
danger which population growth poses to our privacy and our
environment (and therefore our well-being) can be integrated
into our legal concepts which protect them.
Griswold v. Connecticut, which established the right
to marital privacy contains some ideas about general privacy
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in conduct of marital relations, but to the right to be let
alone.. Mr. Justice Douglasin the majority opinion, found
that the Connecticut statute transgressed-a zone of privacy
protected by the Constitution. Although this right to
privacy is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
the Court found that such a right could be implied:
Specific guarantees in the bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance ... Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one ... The Third Amendment in its prohibition against.
the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment
in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."30
Justice Douglas thus found that in order for many guaranteed
rights to have any meaning, certain peripheral rights
must be implied. For instance, while the First Amendment
guarantees freedom of religion, it does not explicitly
guarantee anyone the right to send his children to parochial
rather than public schools. Even so, the Court held that
efforts by the state to coerce children into the public
school system were an invasion of First Amendment rights.
31
Similarly those above-mentioned Amendments contain guarantees
which are dependent upon an idea of privacy, and marital
privacy certainly falls under the "penumbras" thusly created.
There is, however, no all-encompassing right to
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privacy. "VirtVally every governmental action interferes
~32
with personal privacy in some degree" But what "life and
substance"33 do our guaranteed rights have if we are left
with an environment which cannot sustain us? All other
rights are meaningless without a healthy environment.
E.F. Roberts, commenting on the crowded conditions of the
city says:
In a real sense, therefore, a reflective citizen
must begin to sense that he is trapped in a deteriorating
environment. A future in which he is condemned to
live indoors and travel in air-conditioned corridors,
subject at the same time to food rationing, is not
totally impossible. This is all the more absurd
because the economy holds the promise of increasing
leisure, what with a forty week, four day work cycle.
His potential right to privacy turns out, therefore,
to be the right to enjoy his voming encapsulation
away from the wasteland that once was his natural
environment.34
Surely there is a right to privacy which guards us against
such pressures that a growing population brings.
A series of events and court decisions suggests that
we are moving toward recognition of a constitutionally
protected environment. If this were so, the government might
have a compelling interest in preserving it and may therefore
control the growth of population which is in part respon-
sible for its deterioration.
The Fifth Amehdment prohibits the federal government
from depriving any person of property without due process
of law, and from taking private land for public use without
just compensation for the owner. The Fourteenth Amendment,
through its due process clause, forbids state governments
the same. A person's property is thus considered private
59
and beyond the reach of the government. In chapter 2 we
saw that the law of nuisance is a way in which property
is protected against private sources of annoyance. The
courts, in nuisance cases, would "balance the equities"
to determine the reasonableness of the use to which one's
property was put. The adequacy of such a doctrine for pro-
tecting personal privacy and the environment is questionable,
as evidenced in the New York Court of Appeals case Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co.5 There the court refused to issue an
injunction because it would close down a plant worth more
then $45 million and employing over 300 people. It instead
awarded the plaintiffs $185,000 in damages, which was not
36
the total damage caused by the plant. Eva and John Hanks
point out that this in effect amounts to a "condemnation
of private property for a private use by private individuals
who do not have the power of eminent domain. Since the Fifth
Amendment permits the taking of private property only for
a 'public use,' it prohibits by implication, condemnation
for 'private objects'." 37 Clearly, the situation protrayed in
Boomer is inequitable - privacy is not adequately protected.
Nuisance actions are also ineffective in maintaining
the quality of the environment. Private nuisance actions
fail for the reasons stated above; the environment does not
benefit from a payment of damages to the plaintiff. Public
nuisance actions are generally futile, for citizens or
taxpayers cannot bring an action against a public nuisance
as such.38 Most suits in which citizens ask for an order
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to require public officials to perform their duties (mandamus)
and act against public nuisances have failed.
Zoning was seen by local governments as a step by
which the need for nuisance actions could be reduced or
eliminated. This practice of ordering land use fails to
solve the environment's problem, for the types- of pollution
we are concerned with do -not obey the boundaries set by
zoning ordinances. In fact, inhabitants of a different
municipality altogether may suffer serious consequences as
a result of a lawful industry carrying on its activities in
quality of the environment is to be protected, clearly
a means other than nuisance actions or zoning is necessary.
To be effective against environmental deterioration,
pollution and other degradations must be stopped before they
begin. Congress has recognized this and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act. of 1969 40 takes this approach:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the
fullest extent possible ... the policies. regulations,
and public laws of the United States shall be inter-
preted and administered ... (sec. 102)
... to the end that the Nation may
(1) fulfill the responsibility of each generation
as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations; (sec. 101 (b) (1) )
2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful,
productive and aestheticallv and culturally pleasing
surroundings (sec. 101 (b) (2) )
The Congress recognizes that each person should
enjoy a healthful environment and that each person
has a responsibility to contribute'to the pre-
servat ion and enhancement of the environment.
(sec. 101 (c) )
61
Section 101 (c) recognizes a "legal right" to a healthful
environment. This could "in certain circumstances, preclude
any balancing or weighing of interest during the governmental
decision-making process: in some situations no amount
of dollars will outweigh the threat to life."41 The Supreme
Court has not yet been called upon to expound, but when it
is, the right may find a constitutional as well as a statutory
basis.
The courts, independently of Congress, have been ad-
vancing in their ideas about environmental protection.
When a citizen group tries to intervene in an administrative
proceeding or seeks relief on behalf of a public interest
it is usually challenged on the grounds that it lacks
standing to sue. Traditionally, in order to be considered
by the court as a party which can- bring an action, one must
demonstrate sufficient stake in the outcome as a result of
an injury suffered*42 In recent years, however, the courts
have shown willingness to relax these requirements of standing
in environmental cases. In Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC,4 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a statute may create new rights or interests
and thus give standing to one who would otherwise be barred
by the "case or controversy" requirement of the Constitution.
In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe
the same court specifically held that two organizations,
an unincorporated citizens committee and the Sierra Club,
had standing although admittedly they had no personal
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economic claim to assert.
Next, the Supreme Court, in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp45 and Barlow y.
46Collins seemingly adopted a new approach to the standing
problem. First the plaintiff must show "injury in fact,
economic or otherwise" (Data Processing) or "personal stake
and interest" (Barlow). Next, it must be determined that the
plaintiff seeks to protect an interest "arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated" by the
statute in question (l3arlow). The Court cited Scenic Hudson
to show that the interests protected need not be economic,
but can reflect aesthetic and conservational values as well.
. The implications of these 'decisions is great. The
willingness of the courts to accept lower standing notions
suggests that if a plaintiff can present minimal evidence
that he was intended to be protected by the statute, he is in
court. He can then argue fully the existence of a legally
protected interest. This seems to show the courts realization
of a right to a decent environment.
The Supreme Court, in .1972, however, in a stunning
decision, dealt a severe setback to environmentalists.
47
In Sierra Club v. Morton , they refused standing to the
Sierra Club when the Club attempted to stop Walt Disney
Enterprises from developing the Mineral King Valley.
The Court stated that the petitioner did not allege that
the challenged activity would affect the club or its members
in their activities, but maintained that the project would
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adversely change the area's aesthetics and ecology. It
was held that the Club lacked standing because it failed
to assert individualized harm to itself or its members.
Referring to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Citizens Committee, the Court said that their theory
of standing "reflects a misunderstanding of our cases involving
so-called 'public actions' in the area of administrative
law. Therefore, we see in Sierra Club v. Morton, that
the law must advance still further if we are to enjoy a
constitutional right to a healthy environment.
Needed Developments
Professor Christopher Stone wrote a brilliant essay,
which first appeared in 1972 in the Southern California
Law Review, which argues for the revolutionary concept of
affording legal rights to natural objects. In Should Trees
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Have Standing? he suggests the implications of such a
move. For a thing to be the holder of legal rights, says
Stone it means (a) the thing can institute legal actions
at its behest, (b) in determining legal relief, the court
must take injury to .it into account, and (c) the relief
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must run to the benefit of i.50 Toward having standing in
its own right, a "friend" of a natural object should be
allowed to apply to a court for the creation of a guardian-
ship if the object is perceived to be endangered. The
guardian should then have the power to raise the objects'
rights before a court. If and when judgements are made
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in favor of the object, rather awarding damages to the
guardian, the award should go to the object, in the form
of a trust fund to be administered to preserve it. Merely
holding legal rights, Stone goes on, is meaningless unless
these rights have substance and are enforced. One way to
ensure this would be to compel courts "to make findings with
respect to environmental harm - showing how they calculated
it and how heavily it was weighed even in matters outside
the present Environmental Protection Act."57 This would be
a kind of "judicial Environmental Impact Statement." The
appellate courts, through review, would thus give content to
a body of environmental rights, much as content has been
given, over the years, to terms 'like "Due Process."
5 2
The question may be asked of the necessity to intro-
duce such a notion as trees or rivers having rights.
Instead it could be simply stated for instance, that "those
people who are competent to raise the issue of water pollution
ought to have standing," and that "judges ought to consider
the environmental impact of actions." Would we not reach
the same results? Why confuse matters with a novel concept
of "rights" for trees?
Stone claims it is not the same to suggest that intro-
ducing the idea of the "rights" of trees would accomplish
nothing more than the introduction of a new set of particular
rules like those suggested aboves
In a system which spoke of the environment "having
legal rights, judges would ... be inclined to inter-
pret rules such as those of burden of proof far more
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liberally from the point of the environment. There is,
too, the fact that the vocabulary and expressions
that are available to us influence and even steer
our thought . new insights come to be explored
and developed. In such fashion, judges who unabashedly
refer to the "legal rights of the environment" would
be encouraged to develop a viable body of law - in
part simply through the availability and force of
the expression. Besides *.. a society that spoke of
"legal rights of the.environment" would be inclined
to legislate more environment - protecting rules by
formal enactment.53
Were we to follow Professor Stone's advice and grant
natural objects legal rights, our body of law would be ready
to recognize the constitutional right of the people to a
decent environment, and by implication be able to enforce
that right by legislation. The overriding state interests
in protecting our constitutionally guaranteed rights to pri-
vacy and a decent environment would justify the interference
with the right of procreation which compulsory population
measures bring about.
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CHAPTER FOUR. CONCLUSIONS
The idea of compulsory population control seems offensive
because it is an idea which has never before been seriously
considered. The simple fact that mandatory measures would
infringe on the right of procreation is not sufficient cause
to dismiss it as wrong. The common concept of liberty in
society has incorporated in it an implicit acceptance of a large
degree of behavioral controls--those which are necessary to
insure the individual's ability to exercise his own freedom.
Cranston's idea of descriptive content of liberty v. emotive
content is helpful in understanding this. Those controls on
our actions which seem to us to be logical in societal context--
those which do not require a major change in our manners--
tend to go unchallenged. Because of their seeming logic, the
illusion of total freedom remains unshattered.
The time has indeed come when the descriptive content
of our liberty must again take a new form. The pressures
which excessive population- growth is exerting on both our
ecological balance and our social we'll-being demands immediate
action if we are to preserve the freedom of the individual.
The idea of restricting one right in order to guarantee the
opportunity to exercise others is not new--it is, in fact,
the basis upon which societies are built. As demonstrated
by Locke, Mill and Durkheim, above, a state without the power
to so regulate is also powerless to protect the interests of
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its citizens. Presently, our privacy and our environment are
being threatened by over-population, and the government
must act.
It is improbable, today, that the Supreme Court would
validate any compulsory population control measure. Given
our present concepts of personal privacy and of environmental
quality, the Court may not recognize the necessary "compelling
state interest".which is needed in order to interfere with a
right as basic as that of procreation. The Court in Griswold
established a right to marital privacy which may be seen as
a shield which would protect husband and wife from govern-
mental interference in the form of compulsory controls. This
idea of privacy is clearly a barrier to mandatory measures.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. Morton, the Court advanced a notion
which reverseda trend in the lower courts, and makes it
evident that a constitutional right to a decent environment
is not about to be recognized.
These barriers, however, are not insurmountable. Griswold
cannot be interpreted as a license to reproduce regardless
of the consequences for society. What is protected is the
sanctity of a private relationship which concerns two people:
husband and wife. Their own decision to use a means of
contraception, and thereby not have a child, is beyond control.
Griswold does not grant a right to commit acts which have the
effect of depriving others of the ability to exercise their
rights. Excessive numbers of births must be seen as having
this effect, and as Parson's anecdote about the citizens
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of Fertilia shows us, individual couples are to blame.
Furthermore, not only can Griswold be discounted as a "shield"
from population control, it can be viewed as a "sword" for
such policies. It unfolds an idea of privacy which is useful
in justifying the needs for limiting our growth. The Court
speaks of "peripheral" rights, rights which give fundamental,
stated rights substance and meaning. From this construction,
it is not hard to see that our right to privacy is being threatened
by our increasing population. What substance does our right
to .privacy have if we are forced to live in crowded cities
against our will, to ride subways jammed with people, to
breathe air polluted by others who have no concern for our
well-being...? Griswold implies a right to privacy which is
meaningless if we are to look forward to more and more people.
It may be argued, in fact, that Griswold implies a right to
population control.
In this context, one must conclude that the Supreme Court
erred in its findings in Sierra v. Morton. Congress, through
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and lower
courts, in a train of decisions leading up to Sierra, have
shown a realization of a possible constitutional right
to a decent environment. The Supreme Court, in Sierra,
made it clear that it would not right now recognize that right.
Although the Supreme Court is judicial by nature,
few would disagree with the assertion that its decisions often
have the effect of making policy. The Court, however, is
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an instument, not a cause, of social change. We must agree
with Felix Cohen when he says:
When we recognize that legal rules are simply formulae
describing uniformities of judicial decision, that
legal concepts like-wise are patterns or functions
of judicial decisions, that decisions themselves are
not products of logical parthenogenesis born of pre-
existing legal principles but are social events with
social causes and consequences, then we are ready for
the serious business ofappraising law and legal institu-
tions in terms of some standard human values. (Cohen,
"Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach"
35 Colum.L. Rev. 809,847 (1935))
The rules and concepts adopted by the Court are not formed
in a vacuum. The attitudes of the public, through the laws
which are passed, the briefs that are presented, and the arguments
that are offered, to the Court necessarily influence the
manner of judicial thought. The fear which Justice Blackmun,
in his Sierra dissent, is a real one which has been overcome
in the past, and must be reckoned with now:
Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts
so inflexible that we render ourselves helpless when
existing methods and the traditional concepts do not
quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate
for nog issues?(quoted -by Stone, p. 89)
To ask, therfore, of the present constitutionality
of compulsory population limitation is useless. Today's
concepts, probably, would dictate a'finding of illegality--
politically and socially, such control is infeasible. It is
in the context of the future.setting that such a policy must
be hypothesized. The very fact that legislation had been
enacted would signify a great change in political and social
- sentiment. The vast conglomeration of forces working to make
the passage of such laws possible would 'show us that the public
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would be ready to accept population limitation.
We must thenfore conclude that, ultimately, the Supreme
Cburt would not bar mandatory population limitation measures.
To arrive at that point, though, calls for a change in our
conception of personal privacy, individual liberty, and environ-
mental quality, and the relationship which excessive
population growth has to these. Once the initial fear of
the idea of compulsory limitation is overcome, and we begin
to examine the idea on its merits, we will see that the
required change is not so great, and that population control
is not much different from the other kinds of social controls
which government enforces and we accept.
We will come to realize that such control will make us
free.
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